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Introduction
Identity-based Encryption (IBE) was introduced by shamir [1] .This is a public key encryption protocol where a public key is an arbitrary string such as an email address or a telephone number, and the corresponding private key is created by using an identity-based key extraction algorithm, which binds the identifier with a master secret of a trusted authority.
Recently, Sahai and Waters proposed the concept of fuzzy identity-based encryption that uses biometric attributes as the identity instead of an arbitrary string [2] . In a fuzzy IBE scheme, a user with the secret key for the identity  is able to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with the public '  if  and '  are within a certain distance of each other.
In 2005, Sahai and waters proposed the first fuzzy IBE scheme [2] . They described two practical applications of fuzzy IBE of encryption using biometrics and attribute-based encryption, and they proved their scheme under the selective-ID model by reducing it to an assumption that can be viewed as a modified version of the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (MBDH) assumption. Baek et al proposed two fuzzy IBE scheme with an efficient key generation algorithm, also size of those schemes' public parameters is independent of the number of attributes in each identity, proved the security in the random oracle model based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption [3] . Later, Sarier proposed a new biometric identity based encryption scheme which has a structurally simpler key generation algorithm compare to Baek et al's scheme [4] . Also, the decryption algorithm of their scheme is more efficient than Sahai et al's scheme and Baek et al's scheme. Besides, Burnett et al describe an identity based signature scheme that uses biometric information to construct the public key in 2007 [5] .
In this paper, we present an improved biometric identity based encryption scheme which is based on Baek et al's scheme and achieve better encryption efficiency and much shorter ciphertext than other schemes. By using a fuzzy extractor to construct the public key of a user, we reduce the number of exponentiations of encryption algorithm in the group G from O(n) to O(1).Besides, we reduce the number of MaptoPoint hash function and the length of ciphertext from O(n) to O(1). The security of our improved scheme reduces to the DBDH problem in the random oracle model.
Here we present a few facts related to groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps [6] . Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G 1 
Fuzzy extractor
We briefly review the concept of fuzzy extractor. We refer the reader to previous literature for more details [4, 5] . Biometric template b is obtained by concatenating the extracted features  , identity string ID is obtained by using fuzzy extractor from the biometric template b of the user in such a way that an error tolerance t is allowed. 
Here C d is the decoding function that corrects the errors upto the threshold t.
Selective Identity Secure
In 2003, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [7, 8] define a weaker notion of security in which the adversary commits ahead of time to the public key it will attack. We refer to this notion as selective identity, chosen ciphertext secure IBE (IND-sID-CCA). Also in [2, 3, 4] , the Selective-ID model of security for fuzzy IBE (IND-FSID-CPA) is defined using a game between a challenger and an adversary as follows:   .
Efficient biometric IBE Scheme
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Security
Theorem 1 suppose the hash function H1 is random oracles and there exists a polynomial time adversary A that can attack our scheme in the Selective-ID model with advantage e. then there exists a polynomial time algorithm B that solves DBDH problem.
Proof. Assume that a polynomial time attacker A breaks IND-FSID-CPA of our scheme, we show that using A, one can construct a DBDH attacker B.
Suppose that B set the groups G1 and G2 of with an efficient bilinear map, e, generator g and prime order q. B is given ( , , , ) A (q, g, e, G 1 , G 2 , H 1 , g 1 , g 2 , d, F 
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Security and efficiency analysis with other schemes
We compare the size of setup parameters, private key, ciphertext, and computation cost of each fuzzy IBE scheme in table 1. Obviously, our scheme is more efficient than other schemes in size of ciphertext, cost of key generation and cost of encrypt. Besides, the computational cost of the fuzzy extraction FE for generation of identity is small [5, 9] . The properties of those fuzzy IBE are summarized in Table 2 . 
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Abbreviations: | ｕ | is size of universe ｕ which define in [2] ;|S| is the bit-length of an element in set (or group) S; n is the number of elements in an identity; Te is the computation time for a single exponentiation in G; TH is the computation time for MaptoPoint hash function; Tm is the computation time for a single multiplication in G; Ti is the computation time for a single inverse operation in Zp; Tp is the computation time for a single pairing operation; T'm is the computation time for a single multiplication in F; T'i the computation time for a single inverse operation in F; d is the error tolerance parameter; FEID is the computation time for the fuzzy extraction process; k1 output size of the hash function. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an improved biometric identity based encryption scheme. Due to the employment of fuzzy extractor to construct the public key of a user, we obtain a more efficient scheme compared to the schemes in encryption algorithm, the number of MaptoPoint hash function and the length of ciphertext. Furthermore, we proved the proposed scheme satisfy the security requirement under indistinguishability of encryptions under fuzzy selective-ID, chosen plaintext attack (IND-FSID-CPA).
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